Speed of price adjustment with price conjectures

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Abstract

We derive a measure of firm speed of price adjustment that is directly inversely related to market power and compare this to the measure derived by Martin (1993). However, both measures are incorrect when firms have non-zero price conjectural variations and treat competing price levels as exogenous. This is because Taylor series expansions of the demand function implicitly assume that firms influence the level of competing prices in a way that is consistent with their conjectures.

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1. Introduction

One cause suggested for the stable inflationary environment that has existed in many countries since the late eighties and early nineties is a lower speed of price adjustment by firms (Dwyer and Leong, 2001). Empirical dynamic industry studies often suggest that price adjustment is influenced by the level of industry competition, although not all agree on the direction of that influence (compare Kraft, 1995; and Shaanan and Feinberg, 1995).

As a means of introducing price rigidities into the theoretical model, Rotemberg (1982) includes a quadratic price adjustment cost and minimises loss in profit due to the incomplete adjustment to the static equilibrium price. Other studies that derive dynamic pricing equations using this method include Yetman (2003) and Martin (1993). Alternatively, Kasa (1998) and Worthington (1989) maximise the profit function with the inclusion of a quadratic quantity adjustment cost.

By employing a Taylor series approximation to actual profit, Martin (1993) shows that the speed of price adjustment is a function of the second derivative of profit with respect to price at the static equilibrium price and is negatively related to market power in the cases of monopolistic competition and oligopoly with quantity conjectures. Maximising the profit function, we show that an alternative speed of price adjustment approximation is directly a negative function of market power when firms are assumed to have quadratic price adjustment costs. However, neither method correctly derives the speed of price adjustment when firms have price conjectural variations as usually applied. This discrepancy is resolved if firms believe that they influence the level of competing prices in ways that are consistent with their conjectures.
2. Speed of price adjustment and market power

Let the \(i\)th firm have the following profit function:

\[
\pi(p_{it}) = (p_{it} - mc_{it})q_{it} - \alpha_i(p_{it} - p_{it-1})^2
\]

(1)

where \(i\) and \(t\) are firm and time subscripts, respectively, and \(p_{it}, q_{it}, mc_{it},\) and \(\alpha_i\) indicate the firm price, output, constant marginal cost (excluding adjustment costs) and the price adjustment cost parameter, respectively. In the absence of adjustment costs, the firm charges the static profit maximising price \(p^*_it\) and produces output \(q^*_it\).

In this case, the first order condition is 
\[q^*_it + (p^*_it - mc_{it})(dq^*_it/dp_{it}) = 0,\]

where \((dq^*_it/dp_{it})\) is the slope of the demand function in static equilibrium.

Taking a first-order Taylor series approximation of output around the static profit maximising price gives:

\[q_{it} = q^*_it + (dq^*_it/dp_{it})(p_{it} - p^*_it)\]

(2)

The following partial adjustment model results after substituting (2) into (1) and profit is maximised with respect to price:

\[\Delta p_{it} = \lambda \cdot (p^*_it - p_{it-1})\]

(3)

\[\lambda = (-dq^*_it/dp_{it})/(dq^*_it/dp_{it} + \alpha)\]

where \(\Delta p_{it} = p_{it} - p_{it-1}\) and \(\lambda\) is the speed of price adjustment. Note (3) is derived with the use of the static first-order condition. Given that the elasticity of demand in
static equilibrium \([\eta_{it}^* = (dq_{it}^*/dp_{it})(p_{it}^*/q_{it}^*)]\) is a measure of market power, (3)

implies that as market power increases, the speed of pricing adjustment decreases for
a given \(p_{it}^*\) and \(q_{it}^*\).

The speed of price adjustment derived by Martin (1993) is as follows:

\[
\lambda_{it} = \frac{-\pi''(p_{it}^*)/2}{(-\pi''(p_{it}^*)/2) + \alpha}
\]  

(4)

where \(\pi''(p_{it}^*)\) is the second derivative of the profit function at the static equilibrium
price when there are no adjustment costs. Generally, however, the speeds of price
adjustment in (3) and (4) will not be equal. The exception to this is when the demand
function is linear and the Taylor series expansions are exact i.e.

\((- dq_{it}^*/dp_{it}) = (-\pi''(p_{it}^*)/2)\). Next we show that even when firms have linear demand
functions, neither of the above speed of adjustment measures is correct when firms
have non-zero price conjectures but treat competing price levels as exogenous.

3. Speed of price adjustment when firms have price conjectures.

Price conjectural variations are frequently used to model firm conduct in
heterogenous product industries (for example, Bloch and Olive, 2003; Allen, 1998;
and Dornbusch, 1987). They represent the expected pricing responses of other firms
in the industry to a change in the firm’s own price. The larger the firm’s price
conjectures the less competitive its behaviour.

Let the \(t^{th}\) firm have the following linear demand function:

\[
q_{it} = A_{it} - a_t p_{it} + \sum_{j \neq i} b_j p_j
\]  

(5)
where $A_i$ is a demand shift variable, $p_{jt}$ is the price of the $j$th firm, and $a_i$ and $b_j$ are positive parameters. Taking the derivative of (5) with respect to the $i$th firm’s price gives:

$$dq_{it}/dp_{it} = -a_i + \sum_{j \neq i} b_j \theta_{jt}$$

(6)

where $dp_{jt}/dp_{it} = \theta_{jt}$ is the firm’s price conjectural variation with respect to the price of the $j$th firm.\(^1\) After substituting (6) into (3), the resultant speed of price adjustment is

$$\lambda_{it} = (a_i - \sum_{j \neq i} b_j \theta_{jt}) / [(a_i - \sum_{j \neq i} b_j \theta_{jt}) + \alpha].$$

It can be seen that the speed of price adjustment decreases as the weighted sum of the price conjectural variations increases. This speed of pricing adjustment is the same as (4) when demand is linear and the price conjectural variations are constant with respect to price.

An alternative method of estimating the speed of price adjustment is to maximise the profit function from (1) when the $i$th firm has the linear demand function from (5). The partial adjustment model that results is as follows:

$$\Delta p_{it} = \delta(t)(p_{it}^* - p_{it-1})$$

(7)

$$\delta_{it} = (2a_i - \sum_{j \neq i} b_j \theta_{jt}) / [(2a_i - \sum_{j \neq i} b_j \theta_{jt}) + 2\alpha]$$

$$p_{it}^* = [A_i + \sum_{j \neq i} b_j p_{jt} + mc_{it}(a_i - \sum_{j \neq i} b_j \theta_{jt})] / [(2a_i - \sum_{j \neq i} b_j \theta_{jt})]$$

\(^1\) Price conjectural variations are most commonly presented as elasticities. However, presenting price conjectures as the conjectured rate of change in a competing firm’s price for a marginal change in the firm’s own price is analogous to the usual presentation of quantity conjectures.
where $\delta_{it}$ is the speed of price adjustment and $p_{it}^*$ is the equilibrium price in the absence of adjustment costs. While the qualitative impact of the price conjectural variations is the same as above, it is clear that $\delta_{it} \neq \lambda_{it}$.

This discrepancy is resolved if the firm believes that a part of competing prices is endogenous in a way that is consistent with the firm’s conjectures. Let the $i^{th}$ firm’s belief about the $j^{th}$ firm’s price be represented by the following linear relationship:

$$p_{jt} = c_j + \theta_{jit} p_{it}$$

(8)

where $c_j$ represents a component of the competing price that the $i^{th}$ firm believes it cannot influence. Then the partial adjustment model becomes:

$$\Delta p_{it} = \lambda_{it} (p_{it}^* - p_{it-1})$$

(9)

$$\lambda_{it} = (a_i - \sum_{j \neq i} b_j \theta_{jit}) / [(a_i - \sum_{j \neq i} b_j \theta_{jit}) + \alpha]$$

$$p_{it}^* = [A_{it} + \sum_{j \neq i} b_j c_j + mc_i (a_i - \sum_{j \neq i} b_j \theta_{jit})] / 2(a_i - \sum_{j \neq i} b_j \theta_{jit})$$

Comparing (7) and (9), it can be seen that the makeup of the static equilibrium price and the speed of price adjustment are interrelated. Now all three methods for

Note that this is different to consistent conjectures that equate the slope of the competing firm reaction functions with its conjectures, although consistent conjectures could be encompassed in this formulation.
calculating the speed of price adjustment lead to the same result when firms have linear demand functions.

The discrepancy in speed of price adjustment measures arises because Taylor series expansions of the demand function implicitly assume that a component of competing prices is endogenous in a way that is consistent with firm conjectures. To see this, take the following first-order Taylor series approximation of output around the static equilibrium own price and competing prices:

\[
q_i^* = q_i + (\partial q_i^* / \partial p_i^*)(p_i^* - p_i^*) + \sum_{j \neq i} (\partial q_i^* / \partial p_j^*)(p_j^* - p_j^*)
\] (10)

where \( p_j^* \) is the \( j \)th firm’s static equilibrium price, \( \partial q_i^* / \partial p_i^* \) is the own-price partial derivative of demand and \( \partial q_i^* / \partial p_j^* \) is the cross-price partial derivative of demand. If the prices of all competing firms are exogenous, as in the conventional conjectural variations model, then the last term in (10) is zero. Substituting (8) into (10) gives:

\[
q_i^* = q_i + [\partial q_i^* / \partial p_i^* + \sum_{j \neq i} (\partial q_i^* / \partial p_j^*)\Theta_{j,i}](p_i^* - p_i^*)
\] (11)

(11) and (2) are equivalent, as the total derivative of the \( i \)th firm’s output is

\[
dq_i^*/dp_i^* = \partial q_i^* / \partial p_i^* + \sum_{j \neq i} (\partial q_i^* / \partial p_j^*)\Theta_{j,i}.
\]

4. Conclusion

This paper derives firm speed of price adjustment as a function of the slope of the demand function when firms have quadratic price adjustment costs. This directly
inversely relates market power to the speed of price adjustment and provides an alternative to the measure derived by Martin (1993). However, both measures are incorrect when firms have price conjectural variations as they are usually applied. This is because Taylor series expansions of the demand function implicitly suggest that firms divide competing prices into exogenous and endogenous components in a way that is consistent with their conjectures, while the standard method does not make this division. In which of these ways firms behave is an empirical question that is worthy of further consideration.

Mathematical Appendix

Deriving (3)
Substituting (2) into (1) from the text gives:

$$\pi(p_{it}) = (p_{it} - mc_{it})[q_{it}^* + (dq_{it}^*/dp_{it})(p_{it} - p_{it}^*)] - \alpha_i(p_{it} - p_{it-1})^2$$  \hspace{1cm} (A1)

Differentiating profit with respect to the $i^{th}$ firm’s price gives:

$$d\pi(p_{it})/dp_{it} = q_{it}^* + (dq_{it}^*/dp_{it})(p_{it} - p_{it}^*) + (p_{it} - mc_{it})(dq_{it}^*/dp_{it}) - 2\alpha_i(p_{it} - p_{it-1})$$  \hspace{1cm} (A2)

Noting that $q_{it}^* + (p_{it} - mc_{it})(dq_{it}^*/dp_{it}) = 0$ and $(p_{it} - mc_{it}) = (p_{it} - p_{it}^*) + (p_{it}^* - mc_{it})$, the first order condition becomes:

$$d\pi(p_{it})/dp_{it} = 2(dq_{it}^*/dp_{it})(p_{it} - p_{it}^*) - 2\alpha_i(p_{it} - p_{it-1}) = 0$$  \hspace{1cm} (A3)

Rearranging (A3) results in (3) from the text.

When demand functions are linear, the speed of price adjustment is the same in (4) and (6)

Given (5) [the linear demand function] the $i^{th}$ firm’s profit function when there are no price adjustment costs is:

$$\pi(p_{it}) = (p_{it}^* - mc_{it})[A_{it} - a_ip_{it}^* + \sum b_j p_{jt}]$$  \hspace{1cm} (A4)
Differentiating profit with respect to the $i^{th}$ firm’s price gives:

\[
\pi'(p_{it}^*) = A_{it} - a_i p_{it}^* + \sum_{j \neq i} b_j p_{jt}^* + (p_{it}^* - mc_{it})(-a_i + \sum_j b_j \theta_{jit})
\]  \hspace{1cm} (A5)

The second derivative of the profit function in static equilibrium is:

\[
\pi''(p_{it}^*) = 2(-a_i + \sum_j b_j \theta_{jit})
\]  \hspace{1cm} (A6)

Therefore, \((-dq_{it}^*/dp_{it}) = (-\pi''(p_{it}^*)/2)\).  

Deriving (7)

Substituting (5) into (1) from the text gives:

\[
\pi(p_{it}) = (p_{it} - mc_{it})[A_{it} - a_i p_{it}^* + \sum_{i \neq j} b_j p_{jt}^*] - \alpha_i(p_{it} - p_{it-1})^2
\]  \hspace{1cm} (A7)

The first order condition is:

\[
\pi'(p_{it}) = A_{it} - a_i p_{it}^* + \sum_{i \neq j} b_j p_{jt}^* + (p_{it}^* - mc_{it})(-a_i + \sum_j b_j \theta_{jit}) - 2\alpha_i(p_{it} - p_{it-1}) = 0
\]  \hspace{1cm} (A8)

Rearranging (A8) results in (7) from the text.

Directly deriving the static equilibrium price given in (7)

The first order condition when there are no price adjustment costs is:

\[
\pi'(p_{it}^*) = A_{it} - a_i p_{it}^* + \sum_{j \neq i} b_j p_{jt}^* + (p_{it}^* - mc_{it})(-a_i + \sum_j b_j \theta_{jit}) = 0
\]  \hspace{1cm} (A9)

We can then solve for $p_{it}^*$. 
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References


